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A KNOTTY PROBLEM
A KNOTTY PROBLEM
fs the testimony of an agent for a corporation, or a living
party to a contract, and which agent conducted all of the
negotiations with the party, now deceased, admissible in evi-
dence in a suit on the contract?
The question can be answered both in the affirmative and
the negative with different lines of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Missouri as authorities. There is a curious confusion
in these contradicting opinions, resulting somewhat from Mis-
souri having three Supreme Courts: Division No. 1; Division
No. 2 and Court in Bane. However, some of the confusion
exists in the opinions in the same divisions, and it would also
appear that Division Nos. 1 and 2 both have overruled Court
in Banc.
The last three cases decided in 1923, which might have
cleared up the situation, have, instead, had the opposite effect.
These cases are Lawhos vs. St. Joseph Laboratories,1 decided
May 22, by Court in Bane; Allen Estate vs. Boeke,2 decided
July 14, by Division No. 2, and Curtis vs. Alexander,3 Decem-
ber 31, by Division No. 1.
These cases are in conflict. The Lawhon case holds that
the agent of the survivor is an incompetent witness, while
both the Allen Estate and Curtis cases, rendered by different
divisions, hold that the agent is competent.
It will be noted that the Lawhon case was decided by the
Court in Bane, while the later decisions are by different divi-
1. 252 S. W. "4
2. 254 S. W. 868.
3. 257 S. W. 432.
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sions. Under the authority of State ex rel. vs. Reynolds)4 the
divisional opinions count for naught as authority when opposed
by a decision in bane, except in the case decided. That case
was on certiorari from the Court of Appeals. Court in Bane
had ruled one way on a question, but a later decision, in a
division held to the contrary. The Court of Appeals felt
bound under the law to follow the latest decision in point of
time. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the opinion in
bane was superior to that of a decision saying:
"When a divisional judgment becomes final it is final
despite any conflict between the decision upon which it
rests and decisions of court in bane. So far as concerns
the law in principle, however, the decision of court in bane
is still the law, and is in no wise modified or affected by
a conflicting divisional decision. It is apparent that if a
conflicting divisional decision does not and cannot overrule
or displace or affect a principle established by a decision
of court in bane, then the court in bane decision remains
the law and remains the live decision on the question. To
say a divisional decision conflicting with a decision of court
in bane is 'the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court'
within the meaning of Section 6, art. 6, Const. Mo., p. 101,
R. S. 1919, would be equivalent to holding that a division
had overruled court in bane; i. e. that a part is greater
than the whole."
Under this ruling the Lawhon case is the law. But what
will the law be when Court in Bane next receives the ques-
tion for determination? It would seem from an analysis of
4. 278 Mo. 554.
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the prior and subsequent cases that the Lawhon case will be
overruled and the later cases followed.
This, however, is not the first time that the decisions on
this point of the law of evidence have been in confusion.
Rather they have been so ever since 1896 when the case of
Banking House vs. Rood,5 was decided. Prior to that time it
was thought that it was the established rule that the agent of
the surviving party to a contract was a competent witness,
for in 1867 such was the ruling in the case of Stanton vs. Ryan.6
In that case the wife of the survivor, who, as agent for her
husband, had let the contract, was offered as a witness but was
excluded. As to this the court said, 1. c. 515:
"In support of the decision in the court below, it is
contended that as the husband was incompetent on account
of the death of the adverse party, with whom the contract
purported to be made, the wife could not be admitted to
testify to prove a contract when the deceased party was
powerless to be heard on the other side. This view of
the question might furnish excellent reasons for changing
or modifying the law; but if the statute declares differ-
ently, we are not warranted by judicial legislation in per-
verting the plain meaning of the statute to conform to
what we might consider sound policy. It cannot be gain-
said that if the defendant had given a full delegation of
power to an ordinary agent to make a contract for and
superintend the building, that such agent would have been
competent to prove the contract when a dispute arose con-
cerning the same, whether the person with whom he con-
tracted was dead or not."
5. 132 Mo. 256.
6. 41 Mo. 510.
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Then came the first element of discord, Banking House vs.
Rood, supra. That involved a suit upon a note. The president
and the cashier of the bank, both stockholders, were permitted
to testify that they had seen the other party (since deceased)
sign his name to the note. After a general discussion of the
subject Division No. 1, held, 1. c. 263:
"Our conclusion, therefore, is that the stockholders of
a corporation are not incompetent, on account of interest,
to testify as witnesses in a case involving a contract with
the corporation, though the other party to the contract be
at the time dead. His competency depends upon the char-
acter of the evidence offered. He will be incompetent to
testify in regard to transactions and negotiations between
himself as agent of the corporation and deceased. In re-
gard to independent facts he will be competent.
"It follows that the witnesses were competent to testify
to the genuineness of the signature from their knowledge
of it, or as experts.
"Whether they were competent to testify that they saw
deceased sign the note, would depend upon the circum-
stances. Signing the note by deceased was a part of the
transaction which resulted in the contract in issue and the
agent of the corporation who conducted the negotiations,
whether a stockholder of not, could no more testify to
that fact than to any other fact connected with the nego-
iation."
The Rood case was followed in 1898 by Green vs. Ditsch,
a decision also by Division No. 1.
7. 148 Mo. 1.
104
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The wind veered again in 1903 when the point came up
for determination once more, this time in Division No. 2;
Clark vs. Thias.8 There the facts were one Martin, a clerk
for a firm, with which the deceased had traded, and who acted
for the firm in taking a note from the deceased, was permitted
to testify. On appeal the clerk was held a competent witness,
the court quoting with approval from Baer vs. Pfaff,9 as fol-
lows, 1. c. 645:
"The test to be applied is, would the plaintiff's clerks
have been competent witnesses at common law? They cer-
tainly would. They had no interest in the suit and there
is no rule, that we are aware of, that would have disquali-
fied them. Our statute was only intended to modify the
common law so as to permit a party in interest to testify
in his own behalf, provided the other party to the contract
in issue and on trial is alive, or is not shown to be insane.
If either party to the contract is dead or shown to be
insane, the statute has no application, and the common-law
rule must govern.
"The case of Banking House v. Rood, relied upon by
the appellants, is not in conflict with the cases herein re-
ferred to. On the contrary, the case of Stanton v. Ryan,
supra, is quoted approvingly by nearly all the cases upon
the questions involved in this particular contention. Mar-
tin was not a party in interest, either in the note or suit,
hence, we are of the opinion that he was a competent wit-
ness." I
It is curious to note that in this Clark vs. Thias case the
court relied upon Stanton vs. Ryan, supra, and then said that
8. 173 Mo. 628.
9. 44 Mo. App. 35.
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there was nothing in the Rood case to the contrary. This can
hardly be understood as this decision and the Ryan case seem
to be in direct conflict with the Rood case, as was later held
by both Divisions Nos. 1 and 2.
The rule was in a fair way to be fimnly established when
it next came up and Division No. 1, agreed with the Thias case
of Division No. 2, and also held that the agent was competent.
It looked like the question was also set "at rest," by reason
of the fact that this time, in Wagner vs. Binder,0 decided
January 1, 1916, the court expressly overruled Banking House
vs. Rood, supra. Judge Woodson there reviewed all of the
authorities cited in the Rood case as sustaining it, distin-
guished them and held that they really did not support it.
His criticism of the Rood case was severe. He explained the
situation as follows:
"That statute in plain and unambiguous terms provides
that, when one party to the contract is dead, the other
party thereto shall not be permitted to testify, etc. This
language in no sense refers to the agent of the real party
to the contract; and especially may that be affirmed when
viewed in the light of the common law and public policy
which permitted agents, brokers, etc. to testify in behalf
of their principals, and the further fact that said statute
is an enabling statute as practically all of the authorities
hold.1 1 In other words, the first clause of said statute was
designed to remove the common law interest disability of
10. 187 S. W. 1128.
11. Weismueller v. Scullin, 2403 Mo. 466, loc.cit. 471, 101 S. W. 108U.
Southern Bank v. Slattery, 166 Mo. loc. cit. 633, 66 S. W. 1066. Lynn v,
Hockaday, 162 Mo. loc. cit. 122, 61 S. W. 885, 85 Am. St. Rep. 480.
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all parties to a contract or cause of action to testify in
their own behalf, while the second and third provisions
thereof were designed to limit the first to cases where both
parties were living, by retaining said common-law disabil-
ity in full force where one of the parties was dead."
He further held:
"If, as contended for by counsel for appellants, and
as decided in the Banking House vs. Rood Case, that said
statute disqualified both the surviving party and her agent,
then there is not a bank in the state, which holds the note
of a deceased person can collect the same, where the exec-
ution of the note is denied, or where infirmities are shown
to exist, without perchance an -outside person might be
found who knows the signature, or who happened to be
familiar with the transaction out of which the note grew.
The same would be true of merchants, who sell goods on
credit, and subsequently the purchaser should die, as was
clearly shown by Judge Fox on the case of Thias'v. Clark-,
supra. Had the ruling in the latter case been the same
as announced in the Banking House vs. Rood Case, then
clearly neither Thias nor his clerk could have testified
to the execution of the note, nor to the sale of the goods
out of which the note was given."
This case was subsequently approved by Court in Bane in
Signaigo vs. Signaigo,12 in 1918 and Rauch vs. Metz,'3 in 1919.
Division No. 2 continued in the line of its own decision in
Clark vs. Thias, supra, and the Wagner vs. Binder case when
12. 206 S. W. 28.
13. 212 S. W. 357.
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it handed down the opinion in Allen vs. Jessup,14 February 2,
1917. There it held that the husband, who had acted as the
agent of his wife, was competent to testify as to the contract
h1e had made with the deceased, and cited the Wagner vs.
Binder case with approval. This carried with it the ratification
of the overruling Banking House vs. Rood, (the root of the
evil).
Two years later, July 5, 1919, Division No. 2, returned to
its old doctrine notwithstanding the Wagner and Allen cases.
In Edmnonds vs. Scharff,15 it held the agent incompetent. Here
the division, which had decided the Allen case, failed to notice
it and also failed to notice the Wagner case. And it based
its decision on the case of Banking House vs. Rood, which had
been twice overruled, one of the times by this same division.
There the Commissioner held:
"The party to the contract is the person who negotiated
the contract, rather than the person in whose name and
interest it was made.16
Two years more elapsed when, November 19, 1921, Divi-
sion No. 2, delivered the opinion in Orthwein vs. Nolker.17 In
that it again fell into line with Division No. 1, holding the
agent an incompetent witness and discrediting the case of
Edmonds vs. Scharff, supra. It practically overruled that
case when it said that the supporting value of it "is destroyed
by the language of (the) commissioner." It relied upon the
14. 192. S.W. 720.
15. 279 Mo. 78.
16. Banking House v. Rood, 132 Mo. loc. cit. 262, 33 S. W. 816. Meler
v. Tieman, 90 Mo. loc. cit 442 and 443, 2 S. W. 435.
17. 290 Mo. 284.
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Wagner vs. Binder and Allen vs. Jessup cases. Judge D. E.
Blair, in delivering the opinion said of the Wagner case:
"In that case Judge Woodson very ably and fully dis-
tinguished the Missouri cases from other states on the
question and directly overruled Banking House vs. Rood."
The opinion further states that practically all of the cases
prior to the Wagner case, cited as authority for the disqualifi-
cation of an agent, had been distinguished by Judge Woodson.
The next case went to Division No. 1; Darby vs. Life Ins.
Co., 18 and was decided March 14, 1922. The court followed
the Wagner, Thias and Allen cases, holding the agent a com-
petent witness.
With this line of cases, Stanton vs. Ryan, decided before
there were divisions of the Supreme Court; Clark vs. Thias,
Wagner vs. Binder and Darby vs. Ins. Co., in No. 1; and Allen
vs. Jessup and Orthwein vs. Nolker in No. 2; and with Banking
House vs. Rood overruled three times; and with Edmunds
vs. Scharff overruled once, certainly the question seemed stare
decisis, res judicata and de mortuis. Not so however. Came
the decision May 22, 1923, of Lawhon vs. St. Joseph Labora-
tories, from Court in Banc, in which every Judge on the Su-
preme Bench concurred, one in the result. And the strangest
part of the whole decision is that in holding the agent incomp-
etent the court cites only one opinion of the Supreme Court,
that of the often discredited case, Banking House vs. Rood.
How that decision got by the judges, who had written the
opinions overruling the Rood case, is an enigma. This is
the language, 1. c. 48:
18. 293 Mo. 1.
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"Dr. Frederick W. Holkenbrink was incompetent to tes-
tify to the arrangement he made with Lawhon for digging
the sewer. Notwithstanding he was acting for defendant,
he was 'one of the original parties to the contract * * *
in issue and on trial' under the statute as we have con-
strued it.' 9 Nothing in the record suggests the disqualifica-
tion of either Crane or Fisher as a witness. Nor was Will
Holkenbrink incompetent to testify as to the transaction
between Dr. Holkenbrink and Lawhon, as he was in no
way a party to it. But he was not competent to testify
to conversations or transactions which he, as defendant's
acting manager, had with Lawhon with respect to the
prosecution of the work, if there were any such conver-
sations or transactions."
Under the ruling in State ex rel vs. Reynolds, mentioned
above, the decision in the Lawhon case, being the last decision
of Court in Bane, is the law for all inferior courts to follow.
But what is to be said of the case of Allen's Estate vs. Boeke,
decided by Division No. 2, July 14, 1923, less than two months
after the Lawhon ruling; and Curtis vs. Alexander decided
by No. 1, December 31, 1923, about seven months after? The
same judges who participated in the Lawhon case were in
these two divisions, and no mention is made of the Lawhon
case.
In the Allen Estate case the court quoted liberally from
Wagner vs. Binder and Darby vs. Ins. Co. and discusses Clark
vs. Thias, holding that the agent is a competent witness.
19. Banking House v. Rood, 132 Mo. 256, 262, 33 S. W. 816. Taylor v.
George, 176 Mo. App. 215, 161 S. W. 1187.
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In the Curtis case the court said, 1. c. 436:
"But admitting the father was the son's agent, he was
not disqualified as a witness by said statute. It is only
the party himself, and not his agent or any one acting
for him, that is so disqualified from testifying by said
statute, when the other party is dead. Wagner vs. Bin-
der"0 (Mo. Sup.) opinion by Woodson, J., where the
authorities in this state are all collected and reviewed.
Also Signaigo vs. Signaigo (Mo. Sup.) following the
Wagner case."
The decisions of the several Courts of Appeals are not dis-
cussed here for the reason that they are not controlling. The
Supreme Court alone can untangle this knot.
DOUGLAS W. ROBERT.
20. 1g7 S. W. 1128, loc. cit. 1151 to 58.
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